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MODEL PROBATE CODE AND MONOGRAPHS ON
PROBATE LAW: A REVIEW*
Russell Denison Niles t

T

HE current volume in the Michigan Legal Studies, Problems in
Probate Law: Model Probate Code, is an outstanding example of
what can be achieved by the cooperation of a professional association
and a well-financed and forward-looking law school. The Probate
Division of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of
the American Bar Association initiated the project of preparing a model
probate code and sponsored the project through to completion. The
code is the Probate Division's proudest achievement. But the code
would not have been possible without the Herculean labors of Professor Lewis M. Simes, Director of Legal Research at the University of
Michigan Law School, Professor Thomas E. Atkinson, of the New
Yark University School of Law, Mr. Paul E. Basye, of the San Francisco, California Bar, formerly Research Assistant at the University of
Michigan Law School, and the other members of the research staff
of the University of Michigan Law School. Nor would the project
have been possible without the financial aid afforded by the William
W. Cook endowment. Other philanthropists should observe how wisely
the Cook funds have been used in this joint venture.
The need for a model probate code was ~ade clear by Professor
Atkinson in an article published in the Journal of the American J udicature Society in ! 940.1 During the same year a committee of the Probate Division of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
was appointed to study the matter with Mr. R. G. Patton of Minneapolis, Minnesota, as chairman.2 The drafting of the code was started
in I 942 by a sub-committee consisting of Messrs. Patton, Simes, Atkinson and Basye. The probate code was carried through ten tentative

* PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MoDEL PROBATE CoDE. By Lewis
M. Simes-Professor of Law, University of Michigan, and Paul E. Basye---of the San
Francisco Bar, formerly Research Associate, Law School, University of Michigan. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Callaghan & Company, Chicago,
Illinois. 1946. Pp. Ii, 782. $10. One of the series of Michigan Legal Studies, edited
by Professor Hessel E. Y ntema.
Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, New York University.
1
"Wanted-A Model Probate Code," 23 AM. JuD. Soc. J. 183 (1940).
2
Proceedings of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American
Bar Association, p. I 7 ( I 940).

t
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drafts before the final report was submitted to the Section of the
American Bar Association. The code and the supporting memoranda
and monographs are the result of five years of research, drafting and
revision, almost continuous correspondence with representative attorneys in all of the states, and consultation with all interested professional groups. The story of the evolution of the code and of the
methods followed is interestingly told by Mr. Patton in his committee
report to the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association at the r945 meeting.3
The current" volume contains three parts: Part One, the Model
Probate Code, with comments on many of the sections; Part Two,
Appendices to the Model Probate Code, which are for the most part
comparative studies of state statutes; and Part Three, Monographs on
Problems in Probate Law, which are authoritative studies by Professor
Simes and Mr. Basye of several of the basic problems encountered in
the preparation of the code. The monographs have all been published
in the Michigan Law Review.4
To appreciate the competence of the work which has been done, a
reader of this volume would do well, first, to read the code and the
comments quickly, so that he could see the scope and outline of the
project, then to read the memoranda comparing the statutes of the
different states, then to read the monographs, and finally to re-read
the code against the background he has acquired. Everyone who follows this method must be impressed by the tremendous amount of
labor which has gone ·into this venture, as well as -by the fairness, the
imagination, the resourcefulness and the restrained audacity of the
draftsmen. This is no hack job. Nor is it a mere massing of material
for the sake of overwhelming the reader. Bulk there is, but the scholars engaged on this project have mastered the detail and have made
order out of chaos.
Every beginning student of the American law relating to the administration of decedents' estates is bewildered by the variations from
state to state in the organization of the probate courts, in the jurisdic8
Proceedings of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American
Bar Association 65 (1945). The report is reprinted PROB. PROBATE L. 5-8.
4
Simes and Basye, "The Organization of the Probate Court in America," 42
MICH. L. REv. 96 5, 43 MicH. L. REv. I 13 ( I 944); Siiii.es, "The Administration of
a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem," 43 MICH. L. REv. 675 (1944); Basye,
"The Venue of Probate and Administration Proceedings," 43 MICH. L. REv. 471
(1944); Basye, "Dispensing with Administration," 44 MICH. L. REV. 329 (1945);
Simes, "The Function of Will Contests," 44 M1cH. L. REv. 503 (1946).

1 947

J

MODEL PROBATE CODE

tion of the courts, and in the status of the court and of the probate
judge. A New York student who learns that a Surrogate in New York
has the most coveted judicial position among trial judges,5 with full
legal and equitable powers within his specialized jurisdiction,6 is mystified by the status of a Surrogate in New Jersey, who has principally
clerical functions, and by the respective jurisdictions in New Jersey
of the surrogate's court, the orphan's court, and the prerogative court.7
He finds in Connecticut that the probate court is an inferior court,
with no presumption of regularity accorded to its proceedings,8 and
with an appeal allowed from its orders to a trial court of general jurisdiction for a trial de novo. 9
In view of the many differences in probate jurisdiction and procedure, no attempt has been made to draft a uniform act. The Model
. Probate Code is intended to be what the title suggests-a model. The
current volume, with the code, comments, memoranda and monographs, is offered as an aid to the various state commissions which are
now or soon will be engaged on the task of revising the probate statutes
of various states. 10 There was a substantial reform movement before
the war with a number of new probate codes adopted. 11 The current
volume should prove a powerful stimulus to the movement. While
some changes in the code might have to be made because of state constitutional provisions or because of the local judicial system or deeprooted local traditions, it is earnestly hoped that the basic system of the
code will be widely adopted. While the code is not a uniform act it has
been integrated with the uniform acts which have been adopted by
the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
or are now being promulgated.12
5
During the current year Justice William T. Collins resigned as Justice of the
Supreme Court of New York to become one of the two Surrogates of New York County.
A few years ago, Justice Francis D. McGarey resigned as Justice of the Supreme Court
to become Surrogate of Kings County.
6
N.Y. Sur. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) § 40.
7
See REPPY AND ToMPKINs, H1sTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE
LAW OF W1LLs 174-177 (IC128); Simes and Basye, "Organization of the Probate
Court in America," PROB. PROBATE L. 405-407.
8
Palmer v. Palmer, (D.C. Conn. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 861, cited, PRoB. PROBATE
L. 416, note 139.
9
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5624, cited, PROB. PROBATE L. 415.
10
Introduction, PROB. PROBATE L. 9 et seq.
11 New York in 1929, Ohio and, California in 1931, Florida and Minnesota in
1935, Kansas, lllinois and Michigan in 1939 and Nevada in 1941. See Introduction,
PROB. PROBATE L. 9.
12
Introduction, PROB. PROBATE L., 11-12.
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I
GENERAL PLAN OF THE CODE

The code is drafted on the basic assumption that the probate judge
will have the status of a trial judge of general jurisdiction, will have
equal qualifications, and will receive an equal salary. The probate court
is not to be an inferior court with an appeal allowed to a trial ·court
for a trial de nova. Its decrees are to be conclusive, subject only to be
vacated by the court itself or reversed·on appeal to an appellate court.
The code includes a number of innovations. On the supposition
that most probate matters are non-contentious, the draftsmen have
included a method of initiating administration without notice but have
provided for a notice early enough in the proceeding to permit timely
objections. The published notice to creditors is combined with the
original notice. The jurisdiction of the probate court is extended to
land. Indeed, in the fullest sense real property is included with personal property in the administration. Only one contest is permitted and
the number of appeals is reduced to the mini'mum. The emphasis is
on the decree of final distribution, not on the order admitting the will
to probate. The time schedule for administration is speeded up. The
code goes far in dispensing with administration or providing for summary administration of small estates. A number, of these features will
be discussed in the course of this review.

II
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CODE

· A. Status of Probate Court: Jurisdiction
One who reads the monograph, "The Organization of the Probate
Court in America," 13 will realize how necessary it is to have thoroughly
qualified probate judges. The code provides that a probate judge must
have been a member of the bar or held judicial office for at least five
years (§ 4). The probate judge is to be paid a salary equal to that of
a trial judge of general jurisdiction ( § 5). The probate court is to have
co-ordinate status with the trial court of general jurisdiction and, within
its special jurisdiction, is to have full legal and equitable powers ( § 6).
Its decrees are to have the-same effect as judgments in a court of general jurisdiction. The court is not to be in any sense an inferior court
18

PROB. PROBATE

L. 385.
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as the probate court is in so many states today.14 Its jurisdiction is to
be exclusive.15 Broad rule-making powers are given in further recognition that the court is not an inferior tribunal ( § IO).
A concomitant of the elevation of the probate judge from the position held in many states is the shifting of certain ministerial powers and
judicial powers in non-contested matters to the clerk (§ II). This is
sound as proved by the experience in England 16 and in the Counties in
New York City. In New York County, two surrogates are able to
handle the tremendous volume of business by the intelligent use of
clerks with specialized powers; only one surrogate is needed in Kings
County, and only one in Queens County. Another advantage of having
a clerk with limited judicial powers is that there can be a clerk in each
locality even though the probate judge serves a large area.

B. The Administration Proceeding: Notice
One of the important features of the code is the method of giving
notice to interested parties. The proceeding for the administration of
a decedent's estate is conceived of as a unit from the filing of the first
petition to the discharge of the last personal representative (§ 62). It
is a true proceeding in rem.11 Only the first notice is jurisdictional
( § 62). Although notice to interested persons of the hearing on the
petition for a decree of final distribution is provided for (§ 183), a
defect in notice at this stage would not justify collateral attack(§ 62).
It is not required that notice be given before probate or appointment of a personal representative. The code embodies a modern version of probate in common form 18 without notice (§ 68). Unless an
interested person has filed a demand for notice or has opposed the
petition, the court may act on the verified petition for probate or appointment of a personal representative ex parte and without notice
(§ 68). This summary proceeding enables a personal representative
to start his official duties almost immediately after the death of the
decedent. There is no need for a temporary administrator and little
chance for the intermeddling of others.
If a demand for notice has been filed, or the petition has been
opposed, or the court believes that notice is desirable, the court can
direct service by publication and by delivery of a copy of the notice
14

PROB. PROBATEL.

421 et seq.

111

Id. 46, Comment.
16
Id. 395-399.
17
Id. 489-526.
18
Id. 437-443.

'
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personally or by registered mail to each known heir and devisee (§ 69).
By standing order, the court can require notice in advance of the hearing (§ 14-b) and this might be a desirable general rule in large cities,
but an inflexible rule for notice in advance would defeat the scheme of
the code. If the notice is published, a notice to creditors to file their
claims or be forever barred is added so that only one publication is
needed ( § 69-c).
If_ no notice of hearing has been given, as soon as general letters
are issued, the clerk is required to publish a notice of the appointment
of a personal representative which shall include a notice to creditors
( § 70). A copy of the notice shall also be served personally or by
registered mail on each known heir and devisee. Thus, in either case,
only one published notice is needed, and if notice is not given before
the personal representative is appointed, notice is given very early in
the proceeding. If notice of the hearing has been given, the grounds
of any contest must be filed before the hearing ( § 73-b-1); if notice is
given after the appointment of the personal representative, the grounds
of objection must be filed within four months (§73-b-2). The only
exception is that if the ground of objection is that another will has been
discovered the objections must be filed before the final decree of distribution 19 { § 7 3-a) or within five years if no such decree is made 20

(§ 83).
Everything possible has been done to make the order admitting
the will to probate or granting administration final if uncontested or
unappealed from (§ 8,r), subject only to be vacated or modified by
the court itself for good cause ( § I 9). Therefore, if the fact of death
is in doubt, a notice of hearing on the petition must be published and
a copy sent by registered mail to the last known address of the alleged
decedent ( § 69-b). Upon the application of any interested person the
court may direct the personal representative to conduct a search for
the alleged decedent by advertising for information, by notifying public
welfare agencies in appropriate localities, or by engaging the services
of an investigating agency ( § 7 I). Since the alleged decedent is a party,
and will be bound by the decree ( § 8 I), it is of course necessary to
take all possible steps to determine once and for all the fact of death.
If the decedent is not dead he may, notwithstanding the decree, recover
any assets yet in the hands of the personal representative or the distributees ( § 8 r-c '·
·
19
20

See stat. note, "Limitations on Probate of Later Will," id. 275-295.
See stat, note, "Time Limit for Probate," id. 307-310.
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Some critics of the code will object to the admission of a will to
probate or the appointment of a personal representative without notice
in advance. Yet this system works well in England.21 In one-third of
our states prior notice is not required. 22 The code cures the defect
which exists in many states by requiring a published notice immediately
after the appointment of the personal representative. As there will be
only one contest, and the contest will be tried in the probate court
(§ 74), it should make little difference whether it is before or after
initial probate. 23 Since all interested parties will receive notice, it
should not matter greatly whether notice is given before or immediately after appointment of a personal representative. After all, no one
objects to probate in the vast majority of cases. The summary disposition of non-contentious matters as certainly desirable when adequate
opportunity is afforded for objections. The scheme of the code, especially the notice just after appointment, is novel but seems economical,
practical, and fair.
A further objection might be made to the requirement of a published notice in every case. Certainly published notices reach the attention of few persons in a metropolitan area,24 and are often not needed
in a small community. The published notice, however, combines the
notice to heirs and other interested persons with a notice to creditors
to present their claims within four months or be forever barred. There
is, therefore, only one published notice. Since the non-claim period
is a complete cut-off under the code, a published notice is probably
necessary to satisfy the requirement of due process. 25 If so, the code
scheme of combining the function of the two notices is simple and
economical.
The view that the administration proceeding is a single unit, requiring only one notice to interested parties is not one which prevails
21

Id. 438 et seq.
See stat. note, "Requirement of Notice for Probate of Will or Grant of Letters
of Administration," Id. 269.
23
See monograph, Simes, "The Function of Will Contest," id. 682, especially
at 755-756.
24 In New York the publication of notice to creditors has fallen into disuse. If
notice to creditors is published, all claims must be presented within six months of the
first publication; but if no notice is published, all claims must be presented within
seven months of the issuance of letters. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) §§ 207, 208.
The difference of only one month is seldom worth the trouble and expense of
publication.
25
In New York the non-claim statute does not bar the claims of creditors against
heirs and devisees. N.Y. Dec. Est. L. (McKinney, 1938) §§ 170-194.
22
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widely. 26 Yet some states go too far in the other direction. For example in New York, persons interested in an estate might have to be
cited half a dozen times during a single proceeding: when the petition
for probate or administration is filed; 27 when real property is to be
sold, mortgaged or leased ( and there are no express powers in the
will); 28 when either a compromise proceeding 20 or a construction proceeding is necessary; 80 when an advance payment of a legacy is requested; 81 when an advance payment on account of commissions is
required,82 or when an attorney wants his fee approved and an advance
payment made on account.83 And the proceeding for a judicial settlement of the executor's or administrator's account is quite separate, separately entitled and requiring a new citation.84 The view adopted in
the code seems preferable.85

C. Intestate Succession
-The sectj.ons on intestate succession are not an essential part of
the code but since they embody the modern views on several matters
they are worthy of inclusion. First of all the code cuts off all distant
relatives after the issue of grandparents in favor of the state ( § 22-b-6).
That is, a first cousin or a first cousin once or more removed could
inherit but a second or third cou~in could not (§ 22-b-5). The state is
preferred to the "laughing heir." A repetition of some of the spectacular heir hunts will be avoided.
Another feature is the increased· share of the surviving spouse
( § 22-a). Since all distinctions between the devolution of real and
personal property have been abolished in the code, the surviving spouse
becomes an heir and is entitled· to at Jeast one-half of the net estate,
and more if no issue of the decedent survives him ( §22-a- I, 2). If
the intestate is not survived by issue, parent, or issue of a parent, the
entire net estate goes to the suryiving spouse (§ 22-a-3).
26

Cf. monograph, Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem," PRoB. PROBATE L. 489, especially at 509 et seq.
27
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) §§ 48, 120, 140.
28
Id. §§ 215, 236.
29
N.Y. Dec. Est. L. (McKinney, 1938) § 19.
so N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) § 145.
31
Id.§ 221.
82
Id.§ 285b.
88
Id.§§ 231a, 231b.
34
Id. §§ 260, 262.
85 Simes, "The Administration of a Decedent's Estate as a Proceeding in Rem,"
PROB. PROBATE L. 489 at 505 et seq.
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The shares of others than the surviving spouse are determined by
an eclectic system which is neither the parentelic nor the civil law
system. Parents do not take to the exclusion of brothers and sisters
( § 22-b-2). A provision avoids the ambiguities implicit in the common law doctrine of representation (§ 22-c). The various situations
in which issue take per capita or per stirpes are carefully worked out
(§ 22-b, 1-5). The draftsmen have been influenced by the English
statute of descent and distribution.86 Reference is made in a comment
to the similar model statute once drafted by Professor Eagleton for
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 37
The doctrine of ancestral property is abolished; kindred of the
half-blood take the same share with those of the full blood (§ 24);
and adopted children are treated as if natural children of adopting
parents ( § 2 7). Several troublesome aspects of the law of advancements have been specifically covered ( § 29). The value of the advancement is determined as of the time when the advancee comes into possession, unless that time is after the decedent's death (§ 29-b). The
lineal heir of an advancee who pre-deceases the intestate is charged
proportionately, whether or not he takes by representation (§ 29-c).

D. Taking Against the Will
Dower and curtesy are flatly abolished (§ 31 ). This is an' advance
over the pioneer New York statute which abolished dower prospectively but retained the shell of the old institution so as to embarrass
conveyancers and yet confer slight benefit on widows.88 A widow in
New York will elec.t dower only where her husband loses all or most
of his fortune; 89 yet a purchaser of land must worry about the release
of dower because he can never be sure how prosperous the husband
will be at death.
·Under the code the surviving spouse is also given a right of election
against the will of a deceased spouse so that the surviving spouse may
take his intestate share up to $5000, and above that amount one-half
of his intestate share (§ 32). The share so elected passes to the spouse
36

See comment to§ 22, PROB. PROBATE L. 62-63.
Id. 63; See Eagleton, "The Intestacy Act," 20 lowA L. REv. 241 at 244
(1935).
88
N.Y.. Real Prop. L. (McKinney, 1934) § 190; see stat. note, "Abolition of
Dower," PROB. PROBATE L. 256.
89
See: N.Y. Dec. Est. L. (McKinney, 1938) §§ 18(7), 82. The elections under
§ I 8 and § 8 3 are substantially more than dower except where the husband is insolvent
or nearly so at the time of his death.
87

330
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by descent (§ 32-b). This sec:tion is obviously designed to cover the
great bulk of estates throughout the nation since most are of moderate
amount. It is not .so well adapted to the large estate where the income
for life on a share of the estate might give the spouse an adequate
interest. For this reason an alternative section is suggested which
would seem preferable, at least in the states where wealth is concentrated.40 Under the alternative section a spouse takes one-half of a net
estate if it is not over $20,000. If the estate is larger, the spouse may
elect either $10,000 outright, or one-half of the estate, but he must
accept a life income interest in a testamentary trust at its principal
value. The alternative provision is similar to the New York statute.41
The least defensible section is the one covering inter vivos dispositions which reduce the estate of one spouse to the prejudice of the surviving spouse (§ 33). Obviously it is not desirable to read back a type
of inchoate dower by giving a surviving spouse a claim against a purchaser of property from the deceased spouse. Nor did the draftsmen
wish to follow the "illusory trust" doctrine of Newman v. Dore. 42
Such a view casts doubt on the validity of inter vivos trusts in which
the settlor reserves powers which are generally thought permissible.48
The section of the code provides that an inter· vivos gift made by a
person "in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse to share
in his estate" may be avoided by the surviving spouse(§ 33). The term
"fraud" is not defined. Some light as to its meaning is cast by a subsection which provides that any gift made by a married person within
two years of his death is presumed to be in fraud of the marital rights
of the surviving spouse(§ 33-b).
Is this provision an improvement on the "illusory transfer" test of
Newman v. Dore? 44 The New York Court of Appeals in that case
repudiated the fraud test by pointing out that motive should not be
40 The alternative section is set forth in the comment to § 32, PROB. PROBATE
L. 69.
41
N.Y. Dec. Est. L. (McKinney, 1938) § 18(1)(b). See also stat. note, "Amount
Dissenting Spouse May Obtain," PROB. PROBATE L. 258. See also, stat. note, "Spouse's
Misconduct as Barring Right of Election," id 263-267.
42
275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. (2d) 966 (1937).
43 Compare, Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. (2d) 381
(1944), with Kerwin v. Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E. (2d) 299 .(1945), and
Beirne v. Continental Equitable Title and Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721
(1932).
44 Cf.· The present status of "illusory trusts"-the doctrine of Newman v. Dore
brought down to date, 44 MrcH. L. REV. 151 (1945).
·
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controlling.45 One who has acquired land from a husband without
paying "adequate compensation" may be unwilling to improve the
property, or _be unable to mortgage it or sell it, when an inquiry as to
the husband's motive may result in giving his widow an election to
recover half or even all of the property.
If an election is to be given to a surviving spouse to avoid any otherwise effective transfers, why not state more precisely what transactions are avoidable? One possibility might be to permit a surviving
spouse to take a forced share in any of the decedent's property which
would be includible in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes. The principal objection would be that gifts "in contemplation of death" would be almost as troublesome as gifts in fraud
of marital rights. A better idea might be to enumerate specifically the
transactions which a surviving spouse could treat as testamentary dispositions. Included would be inter vivos deeds of trusts in which the
settler has reserved the life income, or the power of revocation or
amendment,46 and all transfers which create a joint tenancy.47

E. Venue
The venue provisions of the code presuppose that the problem of
venue is basically different from the problem of jurisdiction. Whether
the courts of a given state have jurisdiction depends on facts like domi:..
cile and location of property. It is a question of power. The problem
of venue is to determine which court within the state can best handle
the matter. It is largely a question of convenience.48 The code, therefore, locates the venue for probate and administration in the county
where the decedent was domiciled, or, if the decedent was a non-resident, in any county wherein he left property or into which any property belonging to his estate may have come ( § 6 I). If proceedings are
initiated in more than one county, all but the first proceeding may be
45

275 N.Y. 371 at 379.
Most of the celebrated cases have involved trusts of this type. In addition to
the cases cited in note 44 supra, see: Rose v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich.
73, 1 N.W. (2d) 458 (1942); Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54
N.E. (2d) 75 (1944); Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 A. 523
(1915); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Stanford, 256 App. Div. 26, 9 N.Y.S. (2d)
648 (1939), affd. mem. op. 281 N.Y. 760, 24 N.E. (2d) 20 (1939); Krause v.
Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941). The cases are hardly reconcilable.
47
Cf. Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E. (2d) 59 (1942), with Krause v.
Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. (2d) 779 (1941).
48
See monograph, Basye, "The Venue of Probate and Administration Proceedings," PROB. PROBATE L. 527.
46

33 2
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stayed until the matter of venue is determined ( § 6 r-b). At any time
until entry of the final decree of distribution the proceeding may be
transferred if it would be for the best interest of the estate ( § 6 r-c).
The venue provisions of the code are similar to the New York statute
which has stood the test of experience.49

F. Will Contest
A special feature of the code is that only one will contest is permitted-instead of two as in some states and even three in others.50
Since no appeal lies to another trial court for a trial de novo, there can
be no second contest by that means (§ 20). Any interested person may
contest a will by stating his grounds in writing ( § 72). If notice is
given before the hearing of the petition, the contest must take place
before the will is admitted to probate (§ 73-b-r ). If notice is given
after probate, objections may be filed within four months thereafter
(§-73-b-2), except that if a new will has been discovered an objection
on that ground may be filed any time before the decree of final distribution (§ 73-a). If the new will is not discovered until after five.
years from the death of the decedent the will may not be admitted
to probate even though the final decree of distribution has not yet been
entered ( § 83). This limitation will be of special importance where no
prior will has been offered for probate because after the five year
period heirs may deal with the land as owners. As a necessary corollary, title to land cannot be proved by an unprobated will ( § 85).

G. Dispensing With Administration
It is a disgrace to the legal profession that means have not heretofore been adopted to provide' for a summary and economical settlement of small estates. Pioneer work has been done in a few states but
in most jurisdictions the law is quite inadequate. 51 New York has gone
farther than most: the tentative trust of a savings bank account is often
called the poor man's will. 52 The joint savings bank account is· useful
because of the statutory c_onclusive presumption of ownership of the
49

N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) §§ 43-47.
See monograph, Simes, "The Function of Will Contests," PROB. PROBATE L.
682, especially at 701-726.
·
51 See monograph, Basye, "Dispensing with Ad~inistration,". PROB. PROBATE L.
557•
52
Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. II2, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). See also N.Y. Banking L. (McKinney, 1942) §§239 (2), 134(2); id. (Supp. 1946)
§ 310(5).
I
50
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survivor.58 Small balances in savings and industrial banks may be paid
to close relatives of deceased depositors without administration. 54 Wage
claims up to $r50 may be paid to the widow or children of a decedent. 55
Social security or state unemployment insurance benefits may be paid
to the public administrator to be administered informally. 56 The spouse
and children are entitled to certain exempt personal property and not
to exceed $300 in money. 57 But these provisions are haphazard. There
is no provision for dispensing with administration because the estate
is small.58 There is no short-cut if the decedent owned registered securities, an automobile, Qr had money owing to him. Without full-dress
administration there is no one who can e:ffect a transfer, maintain an
action, or give a receipt.
The sections in the code relating to the administration of small
estates seem humane, fair and practical. They represent an important
advance. They are the result of comprehensive research and a masterful study of the problem by Mr. Basye. 59
First of all, the code provides for the distribution of exempt property (§§42,43) and for a family allowance (§44). The allowance
is payable in money and is designed to maintain the family during the
period of administration. Secondly, the code provides that after five
years from the date of death, the heirs of the decedent take free of all
creditors (§ r35-d) and even free of the devisees under a later discovered will ( § 83). These sections minimize the need for administration. But the important features relate to the small estate. Ir the
estate does not have a gross value ( excluding homestead and exempt
property) in excess of $ I ooo, and if after thirty days no one has applied
for the appointment of a personal representative, then a, distributee
may on his affidavit perform the few acts necessary to administer the
estate (§ 86). The affidavit shows the amount of the estate and the
names and relationship of the distributees. Such an affidavit may be
furnished to a person who owes money to the estate, to a custodian
N.Y. Banking L. (McKinney, 1942) § 239(3).
N.Y. Banking L. (McKinney, 1942) §§ 239(4), 134(4), 310(1).
55
N.Y. Dec. Est. L. (McKinney, 1938) § 103(a).
56
N.Y. Dec. Est. L. (McKinney, 1938) § 103(b).
57
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act. (Cahill, 1937) § 200.
58 The Public Administrators of the Counties in New York City are authorized
to administer estates of a gross value of less than $500 without formal letters. N.Y.
Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) § 136(r).
1111 Basye, ''Dispensing with Administration," PROB. PROBATE L. 862.
58

54
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of property of the decedent or to a registrar or transfer agent with
respect to registered property of the decedent, with a demand for
payment, delivery or transfer. If the person who receives the affidavit
refuses to act, he may be sued by the distributee on behalf of himself
and other distributees (§ 87). The person who pays what is due the
estate, delivers property or transfers securities pursuant to such a demand, relying on such an affidavit, is protected to the same' extent as
if he had dealt with an appointed personal representative (§ 87 ). Since
there is no published notice to creditors there is no non-claim period
·and, therefore, estate assets remain subject to the decedent's debts
until the regular statutes of limitations have run. Any creditor who
feels aggrieved by this procedure may avoid it by a timely application
for the appointment of a personal representative. There seems little
reason to fear that distributees will be less honorable in dealing with
the decedent's assets than a relative who is named executor and serves
without bond. 60 Indeed, it would seem justifiable to permit this informal administration in estates of somewhat larger gross value, perhaps
61
$2000 or $3000.
The code also provides for a summary administration of estates
which have a gross value not to exceed $2500 ( exclusive of homestead
and exempt property) and do not exceed the amount which the surviving spouse and children are entitled to as a family allowance(§ 88).
The court may on proper petition and proof of the facts alleged make
an order that no administration is necessary and after finding that funeral and administration expenses have been paid, may make an allowance to named members of the family from the balance of the assets
( § 89). The order of no administration, until'- revoked, permits the
members of the family named in the order to deal with the estate as a
personal representative could ( § 90).
Another section provides a summary proceeding where the estate
is only large enough to pay administration expenses and other preferred
claims against the estate ( § 92). If a personal representative is appointed he may pay the claims in order of their priority and then obtain
a summary settlement of his account and be discharged.
6

° Cf. id. 676.

61

Cf. Address of Gilbert Stephenson, Streamlining Administration of Small Estates, to be published in 1946 Proceedings of the Section of Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law, American Bar Association.
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H. Bond
There are a number of controversial problems relating to the bond
of the personal representative. Should the court have discretion in
fi]fing the amount of the bond or should the statute set the standard?
If the latter, should bond be fixed, as in some states, at double the
value of the personal property, or at an amount equal to such value,
or in some reduced amount? 62 If bond is excused by the testator,
should the court, nevertheless, have the power to require a bond?
Certainly, the requirement of a bond, even in a reduced amount, has a
salutary effect on the personal representative. It is odd that so many
testators are willing to dispense with a bond to protect their estates
after their deaths when they insist on bonding even their trusted employees while they live. Statutory requirement of a bond in an amount
disproportionate to the risk may well be responsible for the current
popularity of stock clauses dispensing with bond.
The code handles the requirement of bond in a fair and realistic
manner. The court is given discretion in fixing the amount of the bond.
In the ordinary case the court shall fix the bond "in the amount of the
value of any part of the estate which it can determine from examination that the personal representative might easily convert during the
period of administration plus the value of the gross annual income of
the estate" (§ 106). The bond is not required (r) where ·excused by
the testator (unless the court then or later finds it proper or necessary),
( 2) where collateral is deposited with the court, (3) where personal
assets are deposited with a trust company subject to the order of the
court, or ( 4) where the personal representative is a corporate fiduciary
( § 107). In fixing the bond the court may of course be influenced by
the fact that the personal representative is also a distributee or that
other distributees have waived the protection of a bond.
Some surety companies have not been satisfied with the bond provisions of the code. 68 But if they have lost because the court is given
discretion to fix the bond in a reduced amount they have gained in
that more bonds are likely to be required, and, further, that personal
sureties will be virtually unobtainable under the strict provisions of the
code. A personal surety must be not merely a landowner; he must offer as security a lien on a specific parcel of real property ( §§ I I I, I I 3).
The sufficiency of the bond and of the security must be approved by
62
68

See stat. note, "Amount of Bond," PROB. PROBATE L. 3 IO.
See comments in Preface, PROB. PROBATE L. viii-x.
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the court(§ 112). This is the New York practice 64 and while it safeguards the estate by avoiding "straw" bondsmen it does almost eliminate the personal surety.
The bond will give full protection to all persons interested in the
estate ( § 109) as to all violations of duty by the personal representatives (§§ no, 172). Execution of the bond is deemed an appearance
by the surety and there may be summary enforcement of the bond in
the administration proceedings ( § 11 8). Liability on the bond for acts
of. the personal representative prior to his discharge extends until two
years after his discharge ( § 119).

I. Claims
The sections of the code relating to claims are of special interest.
In the :first place, the non-claim period is short: only four months from
the date of the :first published notice to creditors (§ 135). The only
claims not so limited are administration expenses and claims of the
United States. All claims must be :filed within the period) even claims
, which are unmatured, contingent, or unliquidated. Furthermore, a
claim once barred is barred forever, not only against the estate and the
personal representative but against the heirs, devisees and legatees. The
cut-off is complete. Mortgages, pledges and liens are, of course, unaffected ( § 13 5-e). Furthermore, if no administration is commenced
within :five years after the date of death, all claims are barred and
estate assets are free of claims ( § 13 5-d).
·
Even if the complete cut-off feature is accepted, some critics will
object to the requirement that contingent claims must be :filed with the
court within the four month period (§ 140). The creditor must :file
a claim before he knows the amount of his claim or even whether he
has one. If no such claim need be :filed, devisees and legatees remain
subject to such claims and are not free to treat the acquired property
as their own. The code requires that contingent claims be :filed and
proved as such. The claimant and the personal representative may
agree on a settlement of the claim on the basis of its probable present
valu~ (§ 140-a). If the court approves the settlement the matter is
disposed of; otherwise the court must determine what reserves should
be retained; or whether assets should be distributed subject to the claim
and with a refunding bond (§ 140-c). On the whole it does not seem
unreasonable to require the :filing of contingent claims. As suggested
64

N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act (Cahill, 1937) § 105.
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in the comment: "Death of a debtor is a hazard which all creditors
should assume and if the creditor seeks to avoid it, he can do so by
taking security for his claim." 65
An innovation is proposed with respect to proof of claims not due
-unmatured as opposed to contingent claims. If the obligation was
entered into after the date of the adoption of the code, the court will
allow the claim at its then value as if it were an absolute claim. Forpre-existing obligations, the court may order the retention of assets
or the furnishing of a bond to secure future payment if the creditor
refuses to accept a settlement on the basis of present value ( § I 3 8).
This provision again tends toward speed and finality in administration.

J.

Probate of H eirship

Since real property is included in all administration proceedings,66
there will seldom be a need for a separate proceeding to determine
heirship. The proceeding provided does not bar creditors' claims and
therefore is of no value until five years after the death of the decedent
(§ r95). It will be used only where there has been no administration
and where none is possible because of the five-year limitation.

K. Guardianship
Part IV of the code relates to guardianship. It is divided into two
subdivisions, one relating to guardians of minors and incompetents in
general and the other to guardians of incompetent veterans. The latter
subdivision contains the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act.
As ·pointed out in the introductory comment,67 there are fewer
modern codes relating to guardianship than to decedents' estates and
therefore the draftsmen have had to do more of a pioneering job. No
attempt has been made to do anything revolutionary. The basic concept of the ward as owner of the property under guardianship has been
retained ( § 22 I), as well as the basi~ rule that a guardian makes contracts in his own name and is personally liable thereon The guardian
may, however, sue or be sued in his representative capacity, and causes
of action wliich affect him in his personal or representative capacity may
be combined in one proceeding ( § 22 8-a, b). Claims ~re made much
65

Comment, PROB. PROBATE L. 142.
See Code, §§ 84, 124, 183.
67 PROB. PROBATE L. 183.

66
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as in decedents' estates, but the're is no non-claim period since there
is no need for early settlement of the estate ( § 22 7).
This part of the code is drafted on the correct assumption that a
guardianship statute should be patterned partly on the law of decedents' estates and partly on the law of trusts. Since guardianship usually endures for a much longer time than the period of administration, it
-is necessary to work out some matters such as investment policy and
accounting procedures by analogy to the law of trusts.
Some of the anachronisms of the law of guardianship have been
eliminated. For example, guardianship in socage is abolished. 68 Guardianship in chancery is also abolished, the probate court having exclusive
power to appoint guardians except guardians ad litem (§ 199). Testamentary guardianship as such is also abolished. All guardians must be
appointed by the court but testamentary nominations of persons as
guardians must be considered by the court ( § 203). The usual list of
eligible guardians is extended to include the State Welfare Department or an equivalent agency (§ 202). Even if not appointed a
guardian, such an agency is given a right to apply for the appointment
or removal of a guardian ( § 206). Such an agency may be guardian
of the person or of the estate or both. A single guardship is possible
for two or more persons who are closely related, such as children of a
common parent or husband and wife ( § 20 5). The code contains conventional provisions relating to bond ( similar to the sections relating
to the personal representative's bond) (§ 213), inventory and appraisement (§ 218), maintenance orders (§ 223), and annual accounts

(§ 233)In line with the provisions of the earlier parts of the code, guardianship may be _dispensed with if the estate is less than $500 (§ 237).
Further, the guardian is authorized to administer a deceased ward's
estate in a summary fashion if no application is made for the appointment of a personal representative within thirty days after the ward's
death(§ 235).
The investment sections may be thought to be too restrictive. No
investment may be made except in state or United States bonds or in
obligations guaranteed by the United States without a prior order of
the court (§ 225). The court, however, may approve the purchase of
any security which is legal for trustees in that state. The requirement
of a court order may be justified by the fact that guardians as a class
68

Cf. N.Y. Doru. Rel. L. (McKinney, 1941) § So.
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are less experienced in investment matters than persons who are called
upon to be trustees.

L. Ancillary Administration
One of the greatest defects in the law governing administration of
decedents' estates in America today is in ancillary administration. There
is such diversity in the di:ff erent states in substantive law and procedure
that administration of out-of-state assets is unreasonably difficult and
expensive. Local statutes are usually designed to protect local creditors.
Such solicitude is usually unnecessary. It is believed that in the vast
majority of cases there would be no risk in granting the domiciliary
representative power to deal as freely with assets located outside the
decedent's domicile as with the assets within it when there is no local
representative. This is the gist of the Uniform Powers of Foreign
Representatives Act, which is incorporated in the code (§§ 256-260).
It should face no obstacle except inertia.
Some of the uniform acts on ancillary administration which are
incorporated into the code by reference have not as yet been promulgated by the Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
When they are, it is urgently hoped that state bar associations will
sponsor their adoption. It takes altruism because no state is especially
interested in making it easy for the representative of non-resident
decedents. But general adoption would be a great help to estate lawyers and a great saving to the beneficiaries of estates.

III
CONCLUSION

The Model Probate Code is a remarkable piece of work. Liberal
provisions for the decedent's family are reconciled with the finality
which is desired for transfer of his realty; both of these somewhat
divergent interests will be subserved by the simplicity, speed and economy which the code contemplates.
At the very least the code is worth the careful study of legislative
committees in all states. The comments, legislative notes, and monographs are a rich treasury to draw on. But while the code has been
drafted as a model, it should not be adopted piece-meal. It is too
carefully constructed to be mutilated by unnecessary changes-by concessions to habitual ways of doing things. Some local traditions may

34°
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be too deep to be disturbed but the system and symmetry of the code
should not be needlessly sacrificed.
The adoption of the code in some states like New York would not
involve a radical change. The adoption of the code in the states where
the probc;1,te court is an inferior court would cause a much wider departure. The time has come when all states should consider a.modern
probate code. The Model Probate Code reflects the best thinking that
has been done in this field. Almost all parts of the code have stood
the test of experience somewhere. The genius of the code is that the
best features of many statutes have been integrated into a rational and
efficient system.

